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1 | Introduction and motivation                                                                                                
Telecommunications is an increasingly relevant sector of a modern economy. Broadly 
defined, it encompasses radio, television, and fixed and mobile telephony. More recently, 
news services such as cloud services, remote control of public infrastructures—like 
underground machines—have become part, or benefited from developments in the 
telecommunications sector. These, in turn, were essential for the emergence of globalization. 
In sum, telecommunications has been in recent years one of the most dynamic and innovative 
economic sectors. 
In the last thirty years, the telecommunications sector has been increasingly liberalized. The 
underlying deregulation process aimed at increasing efficiency, investment and the creation of 
new technologies. In particular, it has given rise to significant price reductions and quality 
improvement of the services provided to consumers. 
We analize the impact of the entry of a fourth operator, MasMovil, on prices, both in the short 
and long term. We aim at depicting the evolution of prices and economic efficiency over the 
period 2005 to 2018, and inferring the role of MasMovil in increasing  increase competition in 
the mobile telecommunications market.  
From the data, we develop two  time series model  using an ECM where we will  study the 
macro effects and  their respective forecast of prices and lines over  the market concentration.  
Also it is  analyze the welfare effects of MasMovil’s entry, the relation between concentration 
and efficiency loss in this market and the evolution of competition.  
This paper progresses as follows. Firstly, we present the literature on competition and 
regulation of telecommunications markets and describe the Spanish market. Then, we develop 
the empirical framework. Finally, we conclude by pinpointing the limitations of our analysis 
and draw attention to future research lines. An annex contains ancillary material.  
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2 | Literature Review  
2.1 | General Characteristics 
 
In the previous century, national governments were in charge of “regulating” the 
telecommunications market, which they did by treating it a state-owned monopoly. However, 
in the ’80s and specially the ’90s, the sector was liberalized, non-state owned 
telecommunications were allowed to enter the market, and fixed costs experienced a 
reduction. This lead to the entry of new competitors and an increase in competition. Several 
economic characteristics of the sector should be highlighted: 
• The sector requires effective price discrimination due to high fixed costs. 
• Competition is affected (and restricted) by capacity constraints inbuilt into the available 
technology. Due to these capacity constraints, the standard competition model most 
adherent to this market is the  Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) model, in which firms 
simultaneously and independently choose their capacity in the first stage to then 
compete in prices in the second stage. 
• The sector is characterized by strong network externalities.Leff,N.H.(1984) 
• The regulator can promote competition by either incentivizing entrants to invest in their 
own physical infrastructure, or alternatively allowing them to use the physical 
infrastructure of the incumbent. This gives rise to a so-called mobile virtual network 
operator (MVNO).  For the most part, most countries opted for the latter regulatory 
approach. Calzada, J& Costas Comesaña, A.(2013) 
• Scale economies are strongly present due to the large fixed costs associated with 





2.2 | Regulation.                                                                                                                      
Telecommunication regulation is currently focused on three main questions: (i) When should 
entry of new competitors be allowed? (ii) If the previous question is affirmatively answered, 
how should entry be effected? (iii) ¿When a Telecommunications Merger should be allowed.?  
2.2.1 | Entry conditions. 
Due to high cost of telecom sector the entrant firm have to use the telecom network of the 
incumbent, at least in the short term. Consequently, the regulator have to fixed the prices over 
the marginal cost in order to compensate the incumbent by the extra expenses derivative of 
the additional maintenance cost. As a result, in order to allow an efficient entry1, we have to 
take into consideration at least tree symmetric aspects between the entry and the incumbent: 
• If the entrant’s costs are lower than the incumbent’s, the incumbent may be forced to 
exit the market. In such case, the incumbent may be unable to catch up technologically 
to then be able to compete. This is undesirable from a social welfare viewpoint to the 
extent that it reduces competition. In some context this entry is denominated parasitism 
entry.    
• Entry entails value creation insofar as it increases transactions. However, it also entails 
stealing business from incumbents, with no social welfare gain(except for cost 
differences between the incumbent and the entrant)if the entry is not produced in a 
competitive way in the retailed sector.  
 
1      In this  context we consider as efficient entry when the increase of global welfare derivate  by the entry of 
competence will be higher than extra cost generated by the new entrants over  the incumbent, 
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• Demand “symmetry” between the incumbent and the entrant might not be assured. If 
the demand face by one firm is quite different from the demand faced by another, the 
regulator needs to take such an asymmetry into account to effectively regulate. 
2.2.2 | Price regulation 
Price regulation must create incentives for quality improvement, issues raised by asymmetry 
of information (adverse selection ex ante, and moral hazard ex post), and rent seeking 
behavior on the incumbent’s part. In general, the regulator wants to apply Ramsey pricing in 
an environment characterized by large fixed costs and low marginal costs. 
Several methods are often used to determine access prices: 
• Efficient Component Pricing Rule( ECPR) .The  access pricing is fixed based on the 
opportunity cost of the integrated access provided depending of the market conditions, 
product differentiation and substitution products. In the telecom market it depends of 
the increase of marginal cost of the incumbent occasioned by the entry of new 
competitors. 
•  Cross Subsidies, in this case the idea is to allow competition of price in the retailed 
sector that have a more elastic demand( local calls) and fixed prices in the another 
sectors( international calls) with an inelastic demand, that will allow to reduce the 
global inefficiency derivative by the higher taxes. 
• Price Caps. In this case, the government fixed a maximum prices close to average cost 
of the main competitors used several index related to inflation, cost evolution and 
market behavior. However, due to the firms can not compete on prices, because prices is 
fixed, they will have strong incentives decreasing the overall quality, decreasing cost 




2.2.3 | Mergers in the telecommunication sector         
In In the telecommunications sector there exist large efficiency gains arising from mergers  
(Neary, 2004). The merger of small firms usually can be effected by simply notifying the 
relevant competition authority.2 In the case of the merger of large firms, several issues arise 
due to the relevant reduction in competition that the merger of large firms potentially entails. 
 
 Firstly, the merger of two firms is not the only way to avoid duplication of fixed cost. In the 
case of telecommunications firms, this can be accomplished by sharing the infrastructure or 
contracting a third party (such as Cellnex in Spain, or OMTEL in Portugal) that provides 
services to several firms. 
 Secondly, allowing the merger of operators who own infrastructure may reduce total  
network capacity to an a less than optimal level, decreasing the supply of services and leading 
to price increases (Levy and Retzes, 1992). 
 Thirdly, mergers participants argue a merger will allow them to increase investment and 
decrease the average cost. However, the European Union allows for joint ventures aimed at 
increasing the investment in R&D, in accordance with the R&D block exemption, or by 
requesting an individual exception to article 101 of Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union. Moreover, decreased competition as a result of the merger may reduce investment 
incentives (Aghion et al., 2005). In addition, a reduction in the number of firms in such a 
highly symmetric sector as the telecommunications industry may increase the likelihood that 
firms end up colluding (Compte, Jenny and Rey, 2002).                
 To sum up, a merger of large telecommunications firms may be socially deleterious and 
should not be waived through without consideration for its social welfare consequences.  
 
2  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation). 
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2.3 | Competition 
Starting in the nineties, when the liberalization of the telecommunications sector took off,  
several mechanisms were implement with aim of fostering entry while increasing economic 
efficiency and social welfare. We discuss three issues: collusion requirements, abuse of 
dominant position and spectrum auctions.  
2.3.1 | Collusion 
Collusion is a central issue hindering competition where the symmetry of the sector and 
restriction capacity using the network infrastructure  possibility it3. However, in the 
telecommunications  sector several factors make collusion hard to achieve: 
• Unstable demand. In the last 20 years, the demand for telephone services has 
increased remarkably, making it difficult to forecast its evolution. This makes it harder 
for competing suppliers to effect collusion.  
• Reduced concentration. Former monopolies have been replaced by oligopolies in 
which  several main competitors operate. 
• Entry costs. Technology  improvements  have decreased  the  entry cost. 
• Cross ownership among competitors. Cross ownership among competitors can lead to 
reduced competition. In Spain, none of the foiur main competitors in the mobile 




3  See CNMC(2017). 
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2.3.2 | Abuse of dominant position,    
this is defined as the capacity of one firm with market power to obstruct the free competence 
between the rest of the firms, the most common are: 
Predatory price practices. Predation through prices entails a dominant firm setting its price 
with the aim of preventing entry or forcing the exit of a competitor or competitors in the short 
run with the aim of benefiting from higher profits in subsequent periods. In these cases, there 
are two elements that allow us to distinguish between abuse of a dominant position, on the 
one hand, and price competition, on the other: the former strategy entails  the observations of 
short-term losses for the incumbent (during the predation phase) and the existence of enough 
market power afterwards, in order to benefit from increased profits after predation has 
succeeded in competitors have been ejected from the market. 
Predation is a phenomenon that can be explain only in a context of imperfect information. 
Players should be uncertain about the each other’s cost conditions. Otherwise, the entrant can 
fully appraise market conditions and will not exit (or refrain from entering) unless it is 
actually incapable of competing.  
Regulation with network effects. Regulating an industry with network effects, such as the 
telecommunications industry, requires that the installed base of end users of the incumbent be 
made accessible to entrants. Only then will the market be contestable. Otherwise, network 
effects will protect the incumbent—who typically benefits from a large installed base of 
consumers—from entrants with relatively minor installed bases. Compatibility of networks, 
interconnection requirements and number portability at low or zero charge are policies that 
regulators often promote to this end. 
Denial of supply of essential inputs. The incumbent may deny access to a key input required 
for an entrant’s successful entry.  
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2.3.3 | Spectrum auctions.           
Auctions have become useful mechanisms for assigning the radio electric spectrum. They 
permit the assignment of licenses in an efficient and transparent manner. However, auction 
design is a complex problem. Design mistakes have strong effects in the final adjudication 
and the government’s revenue collection. Some of these design variables that must be set are: 
the  maximum amount of spectrum that each operator can acquire at auction, the number of 
auction rounds, ascending or descending nature of the auction, the minimum bid increase per 
round, and the information made available while the auction is progressing. 
2.4 | Some comments about the telecom  Spanish market(2004-2019)               
Spain experimented changes from their liberalization of telecommunications in 1998 to the 
end of price regulation in 2004.From the end of regulatory period  until today ,three periods 
emerged: 
The transition from fixed to mobile communication phone calls together with an increase in 
market competition (2004–2012).                                                                                                 
In this period, mobile communications began to supplant fixed telephony. This transition was 
enhanced by two measures: the introduction of portability in 2000, and the deregularization in 
2007 of VNMOs, which required incumbent telecommunication operators with network 
infrastructure to offer access to VNMOs. Both measures allowed VNMOs market share to 
reach 15% of pre-paid calls. Other measures were the opening up of the local loop and the 
reduction in interconnection charges between operators that decreased them by 70% on 
average, although the reduction was not uniform across operators. MasMovil entered the 
market during the period (February ’08), firstly as a VNMO and later, in 2011, with its own 
network obtained in the secondary market, i.e., after the 4G auction had taken place. 
MasMovil developed an infrastructure similar to those of Movistar, Vodafone and Orange. 
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Convergence between telephone operators (2012–2018).                                                                 
ADSL reached 8.8 million lines at the end of 2012. It benefited from the enactment of local 
NEBA (New Ethernet of High Band), which allows for retail  speeds of up to 30Mbps. This 
turned Spain into the EU country of with the highest level of FTTH (Fiber To The Home) and 
was instrumental in the entry of new internet firmas such as Jazztel and Ono. 4G technology 
became widespread during this period. 
 As a consequence of these developments, the phone operators started a fusion process in 
order to consolidate their position to the detriment  of VNMO and independent internet 
providers. The acquisition of Ono by Vodafone (for EUR 7 200 M) in March ’14, the 
acquisition of Jazztel by Orange (EUR 4 055M) in June ’15 and the acquisition of 
Yoigo/Pepephone by MasMovil (EUR 612M plus EUR 158M) in April and June ’16, date 
from this period. At the end of this period, the business model adopted by operators evolved 
again by including data and audiovisual services, such as Movistar+ and Netflix. These 
services, rather than the price of phone calls, became the focal point of competition.   
 
Future perspectives (2019 onwards)                                                                                                  
2019, the process leading to the auctioning of spectrum licenses for operating 5G services 
began. However, the cost of the frequencies acquired at auction together with the investment 
in new infrastructures required by the new 5G technology, will force telecommunications 
operators to share the network or sell the non- useful infrastructure to third firms, such as 
Cellnex. 5G will allow high-velocity data transmission and lower response times of the 
devices operating on the network (lower latency in the jargon of the sector). This 
technological improvement will allow operators offer new services that benefit particularly 
from lower latency, such as synchronous video game playing. These developments will 
determine how the shape of competition in the future. 
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3 | Empirical    Analysis 
3.1 | Methodology approach 
 
 
The main objective of our work is to study the effects of MasMovil’s entry into the Spanish 
telecommunications market. To this end, we will estimate a time series model to analyze the  
macroeconomic effects of the entry over the prices and lines (both post-paid) as a result of 
entry, in a manner similar to Karacuka et al. (2011). 
 
 In this study, we will focus on the post-paid prices per minute as a main independent 
variable and post-paid mobile phone contracts, rather than using pre-paid prices per minute, 
the number of minutes by customer, or both.  
 
The pre-paid price per minute does not depict well the Spanish market’s characteristics and 
evolution. Firstly, the total number of pre-paid minutes has been constant between 2.3 and 3 
billions minutes per year. In contrast, post-paid minutes have risen from 9.6 to 21.7 billions in 
fourteen years.  
 This increased in post-paid minutes over pre-paid minutes was incentivized by new 
contractual offerings that integrate mobile telephony with fixed telephony and Internet access. 
This has boosted the attractiveness of post-paid contracts vis-à-vis pre-paid ones, in particular 
from 2013 onwards, due to the increasing use of mobile data services. We thus believe that 
post-paid prices better reflect the evolution of the mobile telephony market as shaped by 
competition.  
 To analyze the effect of MasMovil’s entry over prices and lines, we estimate an error 
correction model (ECM) to create a contrafactual scenario in which MasMovil’s entry did not 
take place. In our ECM, the main variables are post-paid prices, post-paid telephone line 
contracts and a concentration index, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  
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 In addition, two linear models are also estimated involving prices and the number of mobile 
telephone lines based on two main assumptions: demand and supply linearity and constant 
demand independent of MasMovil’s entry. Based on these linear demand and supply models,  
we estimate the HHI in the contrafactual scenario in which MasMovil did not enter. In this 
case we use two comparative models, one in which we relate efficiency loss and market 
concentration, and  the other were we relate efficiency loss and consumer surplus.  
3.2 | Data and model specification 
 
The data was obtained from Comisión Nacional de Mercados y la Competencia, even though 
most of it was collected by the extinct Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones. The data 
are quarterly and include 57 periods between the first quarter of 2005 and the second quarter 
of 2019. The remaining data was obtained from the Bank of Spain, the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística and an OECD database 
STATA was used for the most part, with the exception of the graphs which were created on 
Calc. 
3.2.1 | Error correction model  
 
Based the assumption that market prices are strongly correlated with past prices, number of 
telephone lines by firm and the concentration of the sector, we develop two times series 
models, one involving HHI and post-paid prices and another using HHI and post-paid lines.   
 The HHI was computed as:  
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 = (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁄ 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠)
2
+ (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑉𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑓𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁄ 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠)
2
 
+(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁄ 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠)
2
+ (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁄ 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠)
2 






where 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 represents the total number of post-paid mobile telephone lines of 
each firm and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 represents the total number of post-paid mobile 
telephone lines. Since we wish to measure marginal effects between periods, we apply 
logarithms to the main variables, namely, post-paid prices, post-paid lines and HHI. 
 
Firstly, in order to obtain the best model, we apply the Box-Jenkins (1973) methodology and 
Akaike’s (1974) and Schwarz’s (1978) information criteria.4 Subsequently, to compare the 
models’ predictive capability, we used the Diebold-Mariano (1994) methodology, and choose 
the model with the smallest root-mean-square error term (RMSD). These results lead us to 
select an ARMA(1,4) for the prices/HHI model and an ARMA(2,2) for the lines/HHI model  
 
 Secondly, we graphically depicted the autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations, and 
observed that both series (prices/phone lines and concentration) are not stationary. As a result, 
we applied a first-difference model in order to obtain stationary. Next, we applied a Dickey-
Fuller (1979) test in order to find out if both series have a unit root.5 We confirmed that they 
do. We then applied the Engle-Granger (1987) co-integration test6 , confirming that both 
variables are co-integrated.  
Thirdly, we use an error correction model (ECM) assuming one lag in the price variables and 
two lags in the case of line variables, from which we developed four prediction models, two 
based on the short term impact using the first difference—Models A)<lines> and 
C)<prices>—and two prediction models based on the long term impact, over lines and 
prices—Models B)<lines> and D)<prices>—respectively.  
 
 
4 See Annex 1, A) Model selection: Box-Jenkins and information criteria. 
5 See Annex 1, B) Unit root test. 
6  See Annex 1, C) Engle-Granger co-integration test. 
16 
 
These results are presented in Table 1, and their mathematical specification is as follows:7 
 
 A)∆𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡)) = ∆𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡−1)) + 𝛽2∆𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡−2)) +
𝛽3∆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝑡)) + ∆𝑢𝑖   
B) 𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡)) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡−1)) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡−2)) +
𝛽3𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝑡)) + 𝑢𝑖 
C) ∆𝑙𝑛 (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡)) = ∆𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑙𝑛 (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡−1)) + 𝛽2∆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝑡)) + ∆𝑢𝑖 
D)𝑙𝑛 (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡)) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛 (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡−1)) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝑡)) + 𝑢𝑖  
 
where 𝛥𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡)) and 𝛥𝑙𝑛 (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡)) measure the absolute increase of lines 
and prices between periods 𝑡  and 𝑡 − 1, measured in percentage points. In addition, 
𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡))  and 𝑙𝑛 (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡))  measure the number of lines and prices 
(measure in euros per minute) in the prediction model, where the interpretation of the 
dependent variable is the percentage increase between 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1. 
 
 
 On the one hand, the first-difference model allows us to eliminate the trend over all constant 
unobservable variables that have an impact on our model but were not included, such as 
inflation or growth perspectives. On the other hand, it does not allow us to gauge the 
evolution of prices and lines in absolute terms.  
 
 
7 See Annex 2, Table 1. 
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Regarding independent variables, (lines postpaid (t-2),  linespostpaid (t-1)) measure the effect of the 
number of lines one  and two lags on the number of lines in period 𝑡,  prices postpaid(t-1)  
measure the effect of prices one  lag on the dependent variable, and  finally HHIt  measures 
the direct effect of concentration on the prices/lines and Ui and ΔUi measures the error term 
on the standard log model and first difference model. 
 
 However, it should be noted that lines models A) and B) are inconsistent with the data and 
theory. In the first difference model on lines, model  A), that evaluates the proportional 
increase between periods, the concentration variable Δln(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑓𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝑡) ) is positive and 
statistically significant. This is not consistent with theory, that postulates that an increase in 
concentration should have a negative effect on the number of lines.  
 
 In addition, in the log standard model over lines, model  B),  two of the three independent 
variables ln(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑓𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝑡) ) and  ln(second lag o lines) are not statistically significant. We 
believe that Δln(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑓𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝑡) ) is not statistically significant in forecasting the number of 
post-paid mobile phone lines because there is no large change of concentration in the data 
series. Consequently, empirical inference based on these results cannot be made.     
   
In what concerns Models C) and D), we can test whether coefficients are statistically 
significant and in accordance with theory, which requires that an increase in concentration 
should lead to increased prices. In models C) and D), two graphs reflect the results of the 
ECM. Three curves are presented, one depicting the original data results, another the 
prediction model based on the  original prices/HHI with MasMovil present in the market, and 
the prediction model based on the prices in the absence of MasMovil’s entry, obtained from 
the linear demand model. 
18 
 
 The adjustment coefficient (R2 ) is considerably larger for the short-term prediction models 
A) and C) than for the long-term prediction models B) and D).  
 
 From the first-difference model over prices (model C), one notes that there is a large 
dependency and correlation of prices (86%) and concentration (93%) on the previous period.  
Evaluating the impact between periods, we observed that concentration comparatively has a 
less relevant effect than the first lag of prices.  
 
     From the standard log model over prices, one percentage point increase in prices gives rise 
to a decrease of 0.08% in prices, whereas one percentage point increase in concentration will 
give rise to a 4.6% price increase. In this case, the impact on the dependent variables of 
concentration is larger than the impact of the first lag of prices. 
 
On the first difference, model  C),the   forecast results are not  close to data(see Figure1)8, 
because the predictive model  is at variance with the actual values, especially from 2013 
onwards. However, we observe  that between the second quarter of 2016 and first quarter of 
2017 there is a  large  increase in  prices that is consistent with the several acquisitions 
performed by MasMovil. However, overall the model does not perform well. We believe this 
to be due to the difference in concentration not performing well in the short term, a period 
during which capacity restrictions do not change significantly. 
The standard log model, model D), yields a good forecast regarding the global trend and the 
levels (see Figure 2)9. We observed that both forecast  lines display a similar trend until the 
second quarter of 2016, when MasMovil merges with PepePhone and Yoigo, after which a 
remarkable change in the evolution of prices evolution becomes apparent. 
 
8   See Annex 3, Figure 1  
9   See Annex 3, Figure 2. 
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3.2.2 | Linear Demand Model  
 
In order to complement models C) and D), we generate two additional models to evaluate the 
long-term impact over prices and phone lines, where we assume: 
• Constant demand between periods, with the only change being the change in 
concentration, while assuming that all macroeconomic variables are the same. We assume 
that demand is the same in both scenarios, with and without MasMovil’s entry, and only 
the supply experiences change.  
• Linearity in the supply and demand functions.  By assuming a linear relationship and 
knowing the initial price/quantity and the initial HHI level and the HHI level of the 
counterfactual (i.e., the HHI level without MasMovil’s market share), we generate the 
prices/quantities of the counterfactual.  
• Linear correlation between concentration/prices and concentration/number of phone lines. 
The ECM on prices demonstrates that there exists a positive correlation between 
concentration and prices. Now, we assume that this relation is linear. 
 
With these assumptions we generate two graphs, one for lines 10 and another for prices11. We 
observed a similar trend in lines and prices, with no clear difference between prices/lines, 
with MasMovil and without, until the second quarter of 2016. At this time, a divergence of 
prices and lines becomes apparent, and becomes entrenched over time. Comparing the total 
results,  we  observe increments of 22 %, on prices and a reduction of 11% on lines at the end 




10   Annex 3 , Figure 3 




3.2.3 | Estimation of the consumer surplus and efficiency losing 
 
Taking into consideration the results over prices and lines obtained in the linear demand and 
supply model, we can estimate the efficiency loss and the impact on consumer of MasMovil 
no entering. We should note that we could not to obtain the supply curve. Consequently, our 
efficiency loss measurements are an estimate of the loss of consumer surplus. Figure 5  
presents the correlation of the efficiency loss with the change in concentration. 
 
 We conclude that the entry of MasMovil prevented an efficiency loss of EUR 325 916, and a 
profits increase and a concomitant decrease of consumer welfare of EUR 2 808 994, 
approximately 2.3% and 2.35% of the total consumer surplus with and without MasMovil 
entry, respectively. Approximately 90% of the efficiency loss and 60% of the consumer 
surplus loss would have taken place after the second quarter of 2016. This leads to the 
conclusion that more relevant than MasMovil’s entry, it was the mergers that took place in the 



































































































































































































Figure5. Lose of efficence/HHI
Lossing of Consumer Surplus Difference  HHI( Secundary Axe) 
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3.3 | Evolution of the mobile phone operators competition 
 
Regarding the effect of entry on the competitive level and the market shares of the main 
mobile phone operators, we should remark that though our data reflects MasMovil’s 
acquisition of Yoigo and PepePhone in the second quarter of 2016, the data does not reflect 
the effect of Vodafone and Orange’s acquisition of Jazztell and Ono in the following years 
because our data treats them as independent operators.  Figure 6 shows the evolution of the 
market shares of the main mobile telephone operators in the post-paid contracts market.  
 
We observe a dynamic market where the effect of the entry on competition was not uniform. 
In the short term, entry did not have an effect on the competitors because the old clients of 
VMNOs became MasMovil’s clients. However, in the long term, we observe a slow fall in 
Orange’s market share, whereas MasMovil continued to see its market share increase. This 
was perhaps due to the fact that Orange was the smallest of the three main operators, 
measured by number of clients, and with the most competitive prices, compared to Movistar 
and Vodafone. Consequently, Orange was the least well positioned to retain clients when 

















































































































































































Figure6. Market Quote by firm
Market Quote_Movistar Market Quote_Vodafone Market Quote_Orange
Market Quote_MasMovil Market Quote, rest of firms
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4 | Conclusions, limitations and main recommendations.  
 
Our main conclusion is that the entry of MasMovil per se did not drastically change market 
concentration, because pre-entry concentration was not to high. However, MasMovil 
generated a relevant change in prices and the total lines of post-paid clients later, after it 
acquired Yoigo and PepePhone in the second quarter of 2016. This, in addition with the 
additional radio-electric frequencies acquired in the secondary market, allowed it to offer 
competitive prices from the following quarter onwards. At the same time, it is possible that 
MasMovil’s entry might have had a social-welfare enhancing impact on the probability of 
collusion among mobile operators. 
 
 We also conclude that MasMovil had not entered, an efficiency loss amounting to EUR 325 
916  and a consumer surplus amounting EUR 2 808 994 would have been felt. We thus 
confirm, in line with economic theory, that there exists a strong correlation between efficiency 
and consumer surplus losses on the one hand, and concentration, on the other hand, in the 
short term. 
 
 Regarding the limitations of this work, we should remark that our models do not analyze 
the impact of MasMovil’s entry on each of its main competitors. The model based on 
instrumental variables controls for supply shocks in the first stage and thus yields the own-
price elasticity of demand in the second stage, in line with the Kataruka et al. (2011) 
approximation, in order to reduce endogeneity of the model. This allows us to analyze the 
final effect over the main operators of MasMovil’s entry. 
 
 Finally, it would be interesting to analyze the conditions under which horizontal mergers 
between telecommunication firms contribute to increase the competitively level  of the sector.  
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Annex 1 | Test Results in of  Error Correction Model Process 
 
A)  //  Selection Model: Box-Jenkins and  Information Criteria.  
 





2 4 -221,100 -204,897 0,2040555 
 




∆𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑) 2 4 -221,100 -204,897 0,20406 
 1 4 -227,468 -213,167 0,20406 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑) 1 1 -290,576 -282,404 0,13317 
 1 2 -292,551 -282,336 0,12901 
 
 
B)  // Unit root test 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root, first difference Number of observations = 56 
 
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
  Test Statistic  1% Critical 
Value 




Z(t)  ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑), trend lags(1)   -3.459 -4.139 -3.495 -3.177 
Z(t)  ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑), trend lags(1) -3.787 -4.139 -3.495 -3.177 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root  Number of observations = 56 
  
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 






Z(t)  𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑), trend lags(1)   -2.536 -4.137 -3.494 -3.176 
Z(t)   𝑙𝑛(𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑), trend lags(1) -2.856 -4.137 -3.494 -3.176 
 
C)  // Engle-Granger Co-integration test 
 
Engle-Granger test for cointegration, first difference N(1st step)= 57 









Z(t) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑); ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼)  -6.316 -4.099 -3.447 -3.121 
Z(t) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑); ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼)  -6.122 -4.099 -3.447 -3.121 
     
Engle-Granger test for cointegration   N(1st step)= 58 









Z(t) 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑); 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼)  -1.478 -4.096 -3.445 -3.120 
Z(t) 𝑙𝑛(𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑); 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼)  -2.721 -4.096 -3.445 -3.120 
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Annex 2 | ECM, formulation and table result  
 
Mathematically our  ECM models are:  
A)∆𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡)
) = ∆𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡−1)
) + 𝛽2∆𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡−2)
) + 𝛽3∆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝑡)) + ∆𝑢𝑖  
B) 𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡)
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡−1)
) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡−2)
) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝑡)) + 𝑢𝑖  
C) ∆𝑙𝑛 (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡)
) = ∆𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑙𝑛 (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡−1)
) + 𝛽2∆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝑡)) + ∆𝑢𝑖  
D)𝑙𝑛 (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡)
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛 (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑(𝑡−1)
) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝑡)) + 𝑢𝑖  
 
Table 1     
Estimation Result for ECM    








Independent Variable Model (A) Model (B) Model (C) Model (D) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠) -0.564** 
   
 (0.164)    
     
∆𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠) -0.335**    
 (0.123)    
     
𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠)  -0.108**   
  (0.0368)   
     
𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠)  0.122   
  (0.127)   
     
∆𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠)   -0.865***  
   (0.129)  
     
𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠)    -0.0893*** 
    (0.0252) 
     
∆𝑙𝑛(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑓𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝑡)) 1.342
*  0.931*  
 (0.653)  (0.388)  
     
𝑙𝑛(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑓𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝑡))  -0.251  4.634
*** 
  (0.150)  (0.404) 
     
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 -0.0111 1.861** -0.0195** 0.266*** 
 (0.00721) (0.628) (0.00677) (0.0630) 
N 55 56 56 57 
R2 0.580 0.178 0.517 0.300 
Standard errors in parentheses 




























































































































































































Figure1. First Difference Model over prices.Model C)











Figure2. Standard Log Model over prices.Model D)















































































































































































Figura3. Demand linear model-Lines
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